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Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Homecomings Financial,
LLC (f1Ma Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.) ("MERS"), Defendant-Respondent in the
above-captioned appeal, by and through its attorneys of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
LLP, respectfully submits this Respondent's Brief in opposition to Appellant's Brief filed by
ParkWest Homes LLC ("ParkWest").

I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case
MERS holds deeds of trust of unquestioned validity covering the property at issue in this

case (the "Property"). ParkWest claims a mechanic's lien (the "Lien") with respect to the
Property, and claims that the Lien is prior in right to MERS' deeds of trust. As MERS' argues
and the District Court held, however, ParkWest's Lien is both facially invalid and unenforceable:
ParkWest failed to register as a contractor under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act, and, as a
result, ParkWest's lien rights were stripped as a matter of unambiguous and unchallenged law
Now, in this appeal, ParkWest claims that it has been unjustly dealt with in that it was
first "stiffed for much of the contract price" that the owner of the Property, Julie G. Bamson
("Barnson") agreed to pay in exchange for ParkWest's services and second, that the district court
then eliminated "all possibility of recovery by ParkWest." ParkWest downplays the fact that it
voluntarily, and without any involvement of District Court or MERS, expressly stipulated to that
mangement with Barnson.

ParkWest, via its agent Zawadzki, violated Idaho law in originally contracting with
Barnson, with whom Zawadzki had a romantic relationship. Barnson and Zawadzki then had a
series of disputes which led to ParkWest filing and attempting to foreclose its Lien. ParkWest
has never sought, in this lawsuit, a money judgment against Bamson for the amount ParkWest
alleges it is owed; instead, ParkWest has attempted to pass the costs of constrnction on to MERS.
To advance that effort, ParkWest and Bamson expressly agreed to a judgment in favor of
ParkWest as to Barnson's interest in the Property, "provided [that] no award for damages [be]
taken against Barnson personally" (the "Barnson Stipulation"). That arrangement allowed
ParkWest to take possession of the Property and continue to press this litigation, while Bamson
was absolved of all liability to ParkWest. There has never been any hint of allegation that MERS
is anything less than a good faith encumbrancer; nevertheless, MERS has been compelled to
expend substantial amounts in costs and attorneys' fees to protect itself from ParkWest's efforts
to have MERS pay for the improvements on the Property and to defend the priority of MERS'
Deeds of Tmst. Any undesirable consequence faced by ParkWest in connection with the
Property or this case has been ParkWest's own doing, and if any party has been unjustly dealt
with in this matter, it is MERS. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

B.

Course Of Proceedings

1.

On November 28,2006, ParkWest filed its Lien against the Property, which is

located in Canyon County, Idaho, and more particularly described as:

Lot 4 in Block 1 of Riverbend Subdivision, according to the
official plat thereof, filed in Book 34 of Plats at Page(s) 2, Official
Records of Canyon County, Idaho.
R. pp. 11-12, 54.
2.

On April 13,2007, Bamson filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in United

States Bankruptcy Case No. 07-00573 (the "Bankruptcy Case"). R. p. 63.
3.

In an Adversary Proceeding (the "Adversary Proceeding") within the Bankruptcy

Case, ParkWest homes brought a Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint against Barnson and
MERS to foreclose the Lien and for a declaration that ParkWest's interest in the Property, via the
Lien, is senior in priority to MERS' interest in the Property. R. p. 85.
4.

On August 7,2007, ParkWest filed its "Verified Complaint To Foreclose Lien" in

the district court (the "State Court Case"). R. p. 4. ParkWest never sought a money judgment
against Barnson in the State Court Case, only the right to foreclose its Lien as against Barnson
and MERS. R. pp. 7-8,99-100.
5.

On February 27, 2008, the district court entered an order, on stipulation of the

parties, to stay the State Court Case during the pendency of the Adversary Proceeding and
Bankruptcy Case. R. pp. 1, 116.
6.

The Bankruptcy Case was converted from a Chapter 7 to a Chapter 11, and a

subsequent attempt was made to convert it from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 13. R. p. 63.
7.

On April 4,2008, MERS moved for summary judgment in the Adversary

Proceeding as to ParkWest's Third Party Complaint, but before MERS' Motion for Summary

Judgment could be heard Bamson moved to voluntarily dismiss her Bankruptcy Case altogether.
On September 4,2008, the stay in the State Court Case was lifted. R. p. 1.
8.

On September 29,2008, ParkWest and Bamson filed a Stipulation For Entry Of

Default Judgment (the "Bamson Stipulation") in the State Court Case, whereby Bamson
consented to entry of judgment as against her interest in the Property, and ParkWest agreed it
would not seek an "award for damages . . . against Bamson personally." R. pp. 107, 117. The
District Court described the Bamson Stipulation as a "side deal with Bamson apparently
relieving her of any further liability." R. p. 131. MERS had no part in the Barnson Stipulation,
and learned of it for the first time when it was filed and served on MERS on or about

September 29,2008. R. p. 117.

9.

On October 2,2008, MERS filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against

ParkWest in the State Court Case, alleging a right to judgment as a matter of law due to:
(1) ParkWest's failure to verify the Lien as required under Idaho Code 5 5 1-109(4);
(2) ParkWest's failure to register as a contractor under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act;
and (3) ParkWest's failure to provide Bamson the pre-contract disclosures required under Idaho
Code 5 45-525. R. pp. 31-34.
10.

On October 6,2008, ParkWest filed its Second Amended Complaint To Foreclose

Lien, which, like ParkWest's original Complaint in the State Court Case, did not request a
money judgment as against Bamson. R. pp. 95,99-100.

11.

On October 7,2008, pursuant to the Bamson Stipulation, the District Court

entered Default Judgment Against Julie G. Barnson Only. R. p. 106.
12.

Thereafter, MERS' Motion For Summary Judgment was briefed and argued, and

on January 6, 2009, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision On Defendant
Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment (the "Decision").
R. p. 115.
13.

The District Court entered Judgment in favor of MERS on January 26,2009.

R. p. 134.
14.
C.

On or about Marc11 9,2009, ParkWest filed this instant appeal. R. p. 137.

Statement Of Facts

1.

In 2004, Bamson and David Zawadzki ("Zawadzki") were romantic partners.

R. p. 44.
2.

During their relationship, Bamson and Zawadzki discussed a business plan in

which they would construct, and sell to the public, residential homes. R. p. 44. At the time of
these discussions, Zawadzki was a member of ParkWest Homes LLC, and in fact was
"personally in charge of managing all work performed by ParkWest." R. p. 112.
3.

Pursuant to Zawadzki's and Barnson's business plan, on March 15,2006,

ParkWest and Barnson entered into a contract (the "Contract") to build a $422,000 home on the
Property. R. pp. 45,49.

4.

The Contract allowed Barnson to obtain a loan fkom Black Hawke Construction

Lending, L.L.C. ("Black Hawke"), by which she purchased the Property on April 10,2006.
Repayment of the Black Hawke loan was secured by a Deed of Trust which was recorded against
the Property on April 10,2006 as well. R. p. 45.
5.

During the time the parties discussed their business plan, negotiated and signed

the Contract, and Bamson obtained the Black Hawke loan, ParkWest was not registered under
the Idaho Contractor Registration Act, Idaho Code $5 54-5201 et seq. (the "Act"). R. pp. 36,40.
ParkWest has expressly admitted this fact. R. p. 76; Appellant's Brief, p. 3.
6.

ParkWest did not register under the Idaho Contractor's Registration Act until

May 2,2006. R. p. 76; Appellant's Brief, p. 3.
7.

On November 14,2006, Bamson caused two Deeds of Trust to be recorded as

Instrument Nos. 200690998 and 200690999, official records of Canyon County, Idaho (the
"MERS Deeds of Trust"). MERS is the beneficiary under the MERS Deeds of Trust. R. p. 96.
8.

On November 28,2006, ParkWest filed its Lien as Instrument No. 20069451 1,

Official Records of Canyon County, Idaho, against the Property, asserting a right to payment in
the amount of $189,117.99. R. pp. 103-104.
9.

The Lien does not contain a verification as required under Idaho Code 5 45-507

and 5 51-109(4). R. pp. 103-104.

10.

On April 13,2007, Barnson filed a petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy relief,

which gave rise to the Bankruptcy Case. But for the Lien filed by ParkWest and the resulting
litigation, Barnson would not have filed for Bankruptcy relief. R. p. 46.
11.

Bamson believes that she has paid ParkWest all sums which are due ParkWest

under the Contract. R. p. 46.
12.

ParkWest did not complete the work required of it under the Contract. R. p. 46.
11.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

MERS asserts that the issues on appeal should be stated as follows:
A.

Was the District Court correct in ruling that the ParkWest-Bamson Contract was

void due to ParlcWest's violation of the Idaho Contractor Registration Act, Idaho Code $5 545201, et seq.?

B.

Was the District Court correct in ruling that ParkWest's Lien was invalid due to

PdWest's failure to comply with the "statement of demand" and "verification" requirements of
Idaho Code 5 45-507 and 5 51-109(4)?
C.

Was the District Court correct in ruling that the issue of unjust enrichment was

not before the Court on MERS' Motion for Summary Judgment?
D.

Is MERS entitled to attorneys' fees incurred on appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code

5 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41, because the law is clear and unambiguous and ParkWest

cannot show that the District Court misapplied the law in granting summary judgment in favor of
MERS?
111.
ARGUMENT
A.

Standard Of Review

The standard of review by the Idaho Supreme Court of an order Erom the district court
granting summary judgment is de novo. When the Idaho Supreme Court "reviews a district
court's grant of summary judgment, it uses the same standard properly employed by the district
court originally ruling on the motion." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc.,
134 Idaho 84,87,996 P.2d 303,306 (2000). Under that standard, summary judgment "shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The moving party has the
burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Orthrnan v. Idaho Power Co.,
130 Idaho 597,600,944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). To meet this burden, the moving party must
challenge in its motion and establish through evidence that no issue of material fact exists for an
element of the nonmoving party's case. Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,
719,918 P.2d 583,588 (1996). The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided

in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
I.R.C.P. 56(e).
The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of
material fact exists to establish a genuine issue. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fmternity, 133 Idaho
388,401, 987 P.2d 300, 313 (1999). "[A] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to
the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary
judgment." Samuel, 996 P.2d at 306.
In its appeal, ParkWest has not alleged any issue of inaterial fact. ParlcWest has admitted
that it was not a registered contractor when it negotiated and entered into the Contract with
Bamson (see, for example, Appellant's Brief, p. 3); there is no issue of fact as to what the Lien
says on its face (R. pp. 103-104); and there is no issue of fact that ParkWest freely entered into
the Bamson Stipulation (ParkWest does not appeal the Default Judgment Against Julie G.
Barnson Only, R. pp. 106-1lo), by which ParkWest abandoned all right to recover on any unjust
enrichment claim. Instead of raising an issue of fact, ParkWest argues that the District Court
committed errors of law in rendering judgment in MERS' favor. For the reasons set forth herein,
the District Court's rulings of law on the undisputed facts were correct and should be affirmed.
B.

The Contract Between Barnson And ParkWest Is Void Under The Idaho
Contractor Registration Act.
Idaho Code 5 54-5204 makes it illegal for any person "to engage in the business of, or

hold himself out as, a contractor within this state without being registered [under the Idaho

Contractor Registration Act]." In that regard, the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (the "Act")
treats construction contractors like members of other regulated professions or trades - such as
lawyers, accountants, doctors, and plumber - have long been treated. In other words, the Act
recognizes the need to limit the business of construction contracting to those who meet minimum
standards necessary for the public's protection, and it imposes a registration requirement as a
means of ensuring those standards are met. LC. r) 54-5202.
The registration requirement of the Act is enforced by Idaho Code r) 54-5208, which
provides that, "A contractor who is not registered as set forth in this chapter . . . shall be denied
and shall be deemed to have conclusively waived any right to place a lien upon real property as
provided for in Chapter 5, Title 45, Idaho Code."
The act of contracting is an essential part of being a contractor, and Idaho Code 5 545203(4)(a) requires registration before any contractor can legally "undertake[], offer[] to
undertake, purport[] to have the capacity to undertake, or submit[] a bid to, or . . . himself or by
or through others, perform construction." ParkWest admits it was not registered at the time it
"offered to undertake, purported to have the capacity to undertake, [and] submitted a bid to

. . . perform construction" with respect to Barnson and the Property. By the plain language of
Idaho Code r) 54-5208, ParkWest's Lien is invalidated.
To underscore the seriousness of its intent to strip an unregistered contractor of its lien
rights, the Idaho legislature also stripped unregistered contractors of their rights to use the power
of the court to collect on a contract procured when the contractor was unregistered:

No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a
contractor, unless otherwise exempt, may bring or maintain any
action in any court of this state for the collection of compensation
for the performance of any act or contract for which registration is
required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a
duly registered contractor, or that he was otherwise exempt as
provided for in this chapter, at all times during the performance of
such act or contract.
I.C. 5 54-5217(2) (emphasis added).
The Act is designed to eliminate contracting by unregistered contractors, and is both in
harmony with, and expands upon, the fundamental condition of mechanic's liens set forth in
Idaho Code 5 45-501: a mechanic's lien can only be claimed by one who is "legally authorized
to perform" the work that forms the basis of the lien claim. Any purported contractor who
negotiates and enters into a contract to "perform construction" without being registered as a
contractor is not "legally authorized to perfonn" "the construction," and therefore has no lien
rights under Idaho law. I.C. 5 45-501 and 5 54-5208.
Both the Lien and ParkWest's Second Amended Complaint To Foreclose Lien (the
"SAC') are premised on the construction contract for the Property ParkWest negotiated and
executed with Barnson during the time ParkWest was not registered as a contractor. ParkWest
was not "legally authorized" to perform the work which allegedly forms the basis for the Lien,
and therefore has no lien rights under Idaho Code 5 45-501 and 5 54-5208.
ParkWest attempts to discount the significance of a contractor's not registering before
obtaining a contract to perform construction work, provided the contractor becomes registered

before actually performing the work. ParkWest's argument ignores the plain language of the
statute, as well as the obvious significance of the contracting stage of an owner-contractor
relationship. The Act's objective is to protect the public by funneling construction work to
registered contractors. An unregistered contractor flouts that objective by contracting to perform
construction work and thus preventing a registered contractor from obtaining the contract.
Moreover, there is no assurance an unregistered contractor who contracts to perform construction
work can, or even will attempt to, satisfy the Act's registration requirements before performing
the work.
By defining the business of a "contractor" to include soliciting, not just performing,
construction work, the Act makes evident its intention to apply the registration requirement to all
phases of the owner-contractor relationship. A contractor that chooses to disregard the
registration requirement waives its lien rights. I.C. 54-5208. Nothing in the Act gives the
contractor an opportunity to cure its failure to register - and thereby rescind the waiver of its lien
rights -partway through the relationship.
While the Act's intent to strip unregistered contractors' lien rights may seem a harsh
penalty for failing to register prior to negotiating a contract, it is precisely the penalty that the
Idaho legislature intended, as underscored by the Act's even harsher penalty for unregistered
contractors: not only are they barred fiom filing mechanic's liens, but the Act bars contractors
from filing any lawsuit to collect under the contract if the contractor was not registered at all

times it acted as a contractor, including during the time the contractor solicited the construction
work. I.C. 5 54-5217(2).
This lawsuit is an action to enforce ParkWest's Lien, and so is an action to collect
compensation for the performance of ParkWest's services on the Property. Inasmuch as
soliciting, negotiating, and entering into a construction contract are acts "for which registration
[as a contractor] is required" by the Act, and inasmuch as ParkWest was not registered as a
contractor at the time it solicited, negotiated, and entered into the Contract, ParkWest was not a
"duly registered contractor . . . at all times" relevant to the Contract. ParkWest is barred under
Idaho Code 5 54-5217 from bringing this action.
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the District Court's ruling that the
Bamson-ParkWest Contract is void, that ParkWest's Lien on the Property is invalid under Idaho
Code 5 54-5208, and that ParkWest's lawsuit to enforce its Lien is barred under Idaho Code
§ 54-5217. Given the invalidity of the Lien, ParkWest has no rights in the Property that are prior

in right to the MERS' Deeds of Trust, and no right to litigate the enforcement of its Lien. MERS
was entitled to summary judgment in this case.
In its Appellant's Brief, ParkWest argues that this Court should give validity to the Lien,
despite the clear Idaho statute denying it. ParkWest's arguments, and MERS' responses, are as
follows:
ParkWest argues: This Court should give validity to the Lien because the District Court's
ruling that the Contract is void was raised sua sponte (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). While the

District Court stated that it "raised the issue of an illegal contract . . .sua sponte," (R. p. 128),
MERS raised the issue of ParkWest's failure to comply with the Idaho Contractor Registration
Act on which the Court's "illegal contract" ruling is based. R. pp. 32, 126. To the extent the
District Court acted sua sponte, such action is not grounds for appeal: as pointed out by the
District Court, the District Conrt had a duty to raise the issue of illegality under Quiring v.
Quiring, 130 Idaho 560,566,944 P.2d 695,701 (1997) and Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3,6,
56 P.3d 765,768 (2002). (R. p. 128).

ParkWest further argues that "Barnson rati$ed the Contract after ParkWest obtained
registration as a contractor by the State of Idaho." (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). ParkWest's
ratification argument fails, first and foremost, because the Idaho Contractor's Registration Act
does not contain a "ratification" provision. If ParkWest wanted to have a legal, enforceable
contract, it could have registered as a contractor, and then entered a new contract with Barnson;
by ParkWest's own contention, it registered as a contractor before making any improvements to
the Property. Instead, ParkWest chose not to comply with the law; ParkWest should not be heard
now to complain of the law's clearly spelled-out consequences.
ParkWest has not cited any Idaho authority supporting its ratification argument. The lone
Idaho case cited by ParkWest has no bearing on this case: Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic &
Hospital, Inc., 122 Idaho 47, 830 P.2d 1185 (1992), involved an analysis of when aprincipal has
authorized the acts of its agent, such that the principal can be liable for the agent's actions.
Manning does not involve the Idaho Contractor's Registration Act or the ratification of any

prohibited action under Idaho law by an aggrieved party, or a party's consent and ratification of
an otherwise illegal contract.
ParkWest's citation to C o m w ON CONTRACTS
and to Corpus Juris Secundum are also
unavailing. First, the C o m w citation expressly states that where a statute makes "the bargains
of an unlicensed person unlawful and prohibited," "the procuring of a license [after entering into
the bargain] does not make the bargainer's antecedent bargain enforceable by the originally
unlicensed bargainer." 15 Co-rn

5

ON CONTRACTS89.14 (2003).

Moreover, the passage

quoted by ParkWest states that a void contract may be ratified only when (1) the law has
changed, and (2) the facts have also changed. ParkWest has made no showing that the law has
changed, and indeed it has not. Corpus Juris Secundum states that only "voidable" contracts
may be ratified; "However, contracts that are void cannot be ratified." 17A C.J.S. Contracts

5 138 (2009). The District Court ruled that the ParkWest-Bamson contract was void, not merely
voidable, and thus it cannot be ratified. Even were the ParkWest-Bamson contract merely
voidable, C.J.S. states that, "Ratification must be accomplished by one with . . . full knowledge
of all material facts. Ratification may not be based upon mere negligence." Id. There is no
evidence that Barnson ever learned, during the course of the construction on the Property, of the
invalidity of her Contract with ParkWest, such that she could have ratified it "with full
knowledge of' ParkWest's act of unregistered contracting. Thus, even the authority cited by
ParkWest stands in stark opposition to the position urged by ParkWest.

There are more hndamental reasons why ParkWest's "ratification" argument must fail.
The Idaho Contractor's Registration Act does not provide for ratification of an illegal contract by
an unlicensed contractor. The logical extension of ParkWest's argument would destroy the Act
entirely: under ParkWest's argument, any owner who allows a contractor, unlicensed at the time
of contracting, to continue with the building project "ratifies" the illegal contract, whether the
owner knew of the illegality or the contractor's unregistered status or not. By its "ratification"
argument, ParkWest would thus render the Idaho Contractor's Registration Act a nullity, and the
Act, designed to protect property owners from unscrupulous contractors, would offer property
owners no such protection. Even assuming a given property owner knew of a contract's
invalidity, ParkWest's argument would make that property owner an accomplice to an
unregistered contractor in flouting Idaho law by granting such owners a license to "allow" an
unregistered contractor to engage in illegal contracting. Nothing in the Idaho Contractor's
Registration Act grants property owners such power.
ParkWest argues that if this Court should uphold Idaho law, this Court will be allowing
"Baunson to avoid obligations she assumed" in dealing with ParkWest. (Appellant's Brief,
p. 17). Neither this Court, the District Court, nor MERS engaged in illegal contracting, and
neither this Court, the District Court, nor MERS participated in the Bamson Stipulation which
released Barnson of personal liability to ParkWest. Moreover, there is good evidence in the
Record that Barnson has not avoided any obligation. In ParkWest's Second Amended Complaint
To Foreclose Lien (the "SAC"), ParkWest alleges that ParkWest and Barnson entered into a

contract to build a home on the Property for $422,000.00. R. p. 98. ParkWest alleges it remains
unpaid for only $141,208.39, and that this amount is due to "increased costs to and work by
ParkWest" attributable to Barnson's "requested changes, together with Barnson's delay in
making numerous decisions." R. pp. 96-98. Thus, ParkWest is not alleging that it has never
been paid anything, or that it built Bamson's house "for free." From ParkWest's own court
filings, it is evident that ParkWest has been paid most of what it was owed under the Contract and Bamson's testimony is that ParkWest has been paid all of what it is owed. R. p. 46.
Finally to the extent Bamson has been relieved of any obligation, it was ParkWest, not
the District Court, who granted that relief: via the Barnson Stipulation, ParkWest released
Bamson from any personal liability for the amounts claimed under the Lien. R. p. 107. To the
extent the District Court's grant of summary judgment in this case would result in ParkWest
being unpaid, such a result is attributable to ParkWest alone. ParkWest cannot complain of a
harsh result when ParlcWest freely contracted for that result.
C.

The Lien Is Facially Invalid.
ParkWest's Lien fails to meet the statutory requirements of both Idaho Code 5 45-507

and Idaho Code 5 51-109(4), which (1) require that the Lien be verified, and (2) specify the form
of the verification. In a phrase, where a lien claimant "has failed to strictly comply with the
requirements of LC. 5 51-109(4) . . . its liens do not substantially comply with LC. 5 45-507."
Covnevstone Builders, Inc. v. McReynolds, 136 Idaho 843, 845,41 P.3d 271,273 (Ct. App.

2001). The Lien does not contain "A certificate of verification . . . follow[ing] the maker's

signature . . . certify[ing] that the maker personally appeared, was sworn, stated his authority for
making the instrument, and averred the truth of the statements therein," as required by Idaho
Code 5 51-109(4) (emphasis added), and therefore the Lien is invalid as a matter of law.
Idaho Code 5 51-109, Idaho's Notary Public Act, sets forth the necessary elements of
proper verification under Idaho Code 5 45-507. See Oregon Shortline Railroad Co. v. Minidoka
County, 28 Idaho 214, 218, 153 P. 424,425 (1915) (holding that "where there is one statute
dealing with one subject in general and comprehensive terms, and another dealing with tl~esame
subject in a more minute and definite way, the two should be read together and harmonized").
Idaho Code 5 5 1-109(4) states that:
A certificate of verification of an instrument shall follow the
maker's signature and shall identify the notary public and certify
that the maker personally appeared, was sworn, stated his authority
for making the instrument, and averred the truth of the statements
therein.
Idaho Code 5 51-109(4) then sets forth the form of a conforming verification:
the verification of a corporate document by an officer of the
corporation should be in substantially the following form:
I, ...............,a notary public, do hereby certify that on this .... day
of .........., 19..., personally appeared before me ................,who,
being by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the .......... of
............,that he signed the foregoing document as .............. of the
corporation, and that the statement therein contained are true.
These statutory requirements are clear and unambiguous, yet ParkWest failed to comply with
them, making the Lien invalid on its face

The Lien at issue is a lien of ParkWest Homes LLC, and is therefore a corporate
document requiring a corporate verification in substantially the form set forth in Idaho Code

5 51-109(4).

To hold otherwise would be to make the statutory language of Idaho Code 3 51-

109(4) a nullity, something that Idaho Courts have refused to do with respect to mechanic's lien
verifications. Cornerstone, 41 P.3d at 275. See Zener v. Velde, 135 Idaho 352,356, 17 P.3d
296,300 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a statutory interpretation that would "lead to the absurd
result of nullifying the effect of [a] subsection" of the statute must be rejected). See also State v.

Doe, 144 Idaho 796, 172 P.3d 551, 554 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that "It is incumbent upon a
court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity"). There is no dispute
that the "verification" argued for by ParkWest is not in the corporate form required by Idaho
Code 5 51-109(4), and therefore the Lien is facially invalid.
Strict construction of the verification requirement is consistent with Idaho courts' strict
construction of other procedural requirements necessary to perfect and foreclose on a mechanic's
lien. For example, Idaho courts have a long history of strictly construing the six (6) month
limitation for filing foreclosure actions under Idaho Code 5 45-510. See Western Loan and Bldg.

Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 497,501, 185 P.554 (1919) (voiding a lien after suit to
foreclose was untimely filed); D. W: Standrod & Co. v. Utah Implement-Vehicle Co., 223 F.517,
518 (9th Cir. 1915) (voiding a lien as against all subsequent encumbrances who were not made
parties to an action to foreclose the lien within six months from the date of filing thereof); and

Utah Implement-Vehicle Co. v. Bowman, 209 F. 942,947-48 @. Idaho 1913) (where the

mortgagee of property was not made a party to a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien within the
statutory period, the lien was of no effect against mortgagee's interests).
Idaho courts have also strictly construed Idaho Code § 45-507's requirement that a true
and correct copy of the claim of lien be served on the owner of the property no later than five
business days following the filing of the claim of lien. In Ashley Glass Co., Inc. v. Bithell, 123
Idaho 544, 850 P.2d 193 (1993), the lien claimant orally notified h e property owner of the lien
but made no effort to serve the mechanic's lien by mail or personally. The Idaho Supreme Court
held that the lien was invalid because it was not served on the owner within the time limit
specified in the statute, and such service was "a statutory condition for an effective lien." Id.,
850 P.2d at 196. Statutory conditions for valid liens are strictly construed, and this Court should
follow the precedent set by Idaho courts and others in holding that a verification in the form
required by Idaho Code 5 51-109 is a mandatory condition precedent, without which the lien is
invalid.

In its Appellant's Brief, ParkWest argues, "Although Idaho Code Section 45-507(4)
expressly requires that ParkWest's Claim of Lien be verified by the oath of ParkWest or its agent
or attorney, nowhere does the statue require that the verzj5cation explicitly adhere to any
speczj5ed form." (Appellant's Brief, p. 12). As set forth above, Idaho Code § 51-109 defines
"verification" and sets forth the forms of "proper" verifications under Idaho law. Idaho Code
§ 45-507 does not need to expressly incorporate 51-109 to make 51-109 applicable: the

verification requirement has meaning only to the extent it refers to other provisions of the Idaho

Code. ParkWest's citation to State v. Parker, 81 Idaho 51, 336 P.2d 318 (1959) does not supporl
ParkWest's argument. State v. Parker concerned the form of oath required in connection with a
criminal complaint, and the Court expressly held that the criminal complaint at issue sufficiently
cornplied with Idaho Code section 19-3901, because Idaho's criminal law "statute does not
provide for a particular form of oath." Id. 336 P.2d at 320. As set forth herein, Idaho law does
provide for a particular form of veriiication when a corporation files a mechanic's lien.
ParkWest would have this Court hold that by failing to reference Idaho Code $ 51-109,
section 45-507 nullifies 51-109. ParkWest's argument that "no form of verification is specified"
implies that the verification requirement is wholly subjective, that whatever the lien claimant
deems a "verification" will suffice, regardless of what Idaho law says. Under ParkWest's
argument, the lien claimant, not the Court, decides whether a lien contains a proper verification.
ParkWest's argument has far-reaching implications. Idaho Code 5 45-507 requires liens
to be filed "for record with the county recorder," but does not expressly reference any of Idaho's
recording statutes. An extension of ParkWest's argument might, therefore, make the recording
laws inapplicable to mechanic's liens and permit a lien claimant alone to determine when a lien
has been "filed for record." ParkWest's argument has similar implications with respect to the
contents of the lien claim or service of the claim of lien. That ParkWest does in fact intend its
argument to have this kind of far-reaching implications is reflected in ParkWest's argument that
because 'Section 45-507 does not explicitly require [thephrase 'after deducting alljust credits
and offsets'] to be included in a lien claim, ParkWest's Claim o f l i e n substantially complies with

the requirement of the controlling statute." (Appellant's Brief, p. 10). ParkWest concedes that

ParkWest's lien claim does not contain the statutory language, yet ParkWest would have this
Court nullify that statutory requirement: ParkWest urges that because it has decided that its lien
complies with Idaho Code 5 45-507 ("'because ParkWest's statement of its claim was infact
made 'after deducting all just credits and offsets'

. . . ParkWest's Claim of Lien substantially

complies with the . . . statute" (Appellant's Brief, p. lo)), the Lien is valid. This Court should
not nullify the statutory requirements of either Idaho Code 5 45-507 or 5 51-109. The absence of
the statutory language "after deducting all just credits and offsets" was not the sole or even
primary basis for the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of MERS, hut
it is illustrative of ParkWest's Lien deficiencies, and it is also indicative of the direction
ParkWest would have this Court steer Idaho's mechanic's lien law. Mechanic's liens are
creatures of statute, and the statutory requirements should be strictly complied with; no portion
of the Idaho Code should be dismissed or nullified simply to validate a mechanic's lien, as urged
by ParkWest.
D.

Because Of ParkWest's Side Deal With Barnson, The Issue Of Unjust Enrichment
Was Not Before The District Court And Is Not Before This Court.
After finding that the ParkWest-Bamson Contract was void, the District Court then asked

and answered the following rhetorical question:
Does that mean that PARKWEST built the house free? Not until it
elected to enter into a side deal with BARNSON apparently
relieving her of any further liability. At the very least,
PARKWEST should have been entitled to a recovery based upon

unjust enrichment. [Citation omitted.] Nevertheless, that issue is
not before the court.
R. p. 131. The "side deal" the District Court was referring to was the Bamson Stipulation
referenced above, wherein ParkWest voluntarily, and without any influence of the Court or
MERS, agreed to release "BARNSON from any personal liability." R. p. 117. The Bamson
Stipulation thus released Barnson from any liability to ParkWest under an unjust enrichment
claim. ParkWest does not have a right to recover for unjust enrichment against MERS, the only
other defendant in this lawsuit, and ParkWest has never asserted such a right. See Great Plains

Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754,979 P.2d 627 (Idaho 1999). Moreover,
the issue of unjust enrichment has never been before this Court: ParkWest's Second Amended
Complaint is entitled "Second Amended Complaint To Foreclose Lien" (emphasis added), and
does not assert a right to a money judgment under unjust enrichment or any other theory. The
Second Amended Complaint only asks the District Court to declare ParkWest's Lien valid and
enforceable, and thus Plaintiffs citations to Cafferty v. State, 144 Idaho 324, 160 P.3d 763
(2007), and SeinigerLaw Ofice v. North Pacz$c Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 178 P.3d 606 (2008),
are unavailing. The issue of unjust enrichment was never before the District Court, and to the
extent ParkWest would raise it now, it is ilnproperly before this Court:
This Court will not entertain issues or theories not raised in the
court below. In rejecting new issues, this Court often notes that it
"does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal." The
R m e l l s try to satisfy this rule by arguing that because they
raised these issues in their Amended Answer, they are technically
not being raised for the first time on appeal. However, Idaho case

law requires that the paxty asserting an issue seek a specific ruling
on that issue at each stage of the appeal. Asserting an issue in the
pleadings and failing to actually argue that issue and seek a ruling
thereon is inadequate to preserve that issue for appeal.
Rammell v. Idaho State Dep't ofAgriculture, 147 Idaho 415,210 P.3d 523 (2009) (internal

citations omitted).
ParkWest argues: "Because the Oractual statements in ParkWest's Second Amended
Complaintj fully supports ParkWest's recovery under the alternative legal theor[y] of unjust
enrichment . . . should the Contract be illegal and void, the district court also erred in ruling
sua sponte that the issue of unjust enrichment was not raised by allegations pleaded in the SAC."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 20). As set forth above, there are at least four reasons that the issue of
unjust enrichment was not before the District Court, and should not be considered by this Court:
(1) in its Second Amended Complaint, ParkWest only sought the right to foreclose its Lien as
against Bamson and MERS' interests in the Property, and the theory of unjust enrichment was
never alleged against anyone; (2) the issue on summaryjudgment in the proceedings below
concerned ParkWest's right to foreclose its Lien as against MERS -the issue of unjust
enrichment was not argued by any party, nor did ParkWest seek "a specific ruling on that issue,"
as required by Rammell, supra; (3) ParkWest affirmatively and expressly abandoned any unjust
enrichment claim it might have had when it entered into the Bamson Stipulation; and

(4) ParkWest has no claim for unjust enrichment as against MERS under Great Plains
Equipment, Znc., supra.

E.

MERS' Request For Attorneys' Fees On Appeal.

The basis for MERS' request for attorneys' fees is, as set forth herein, that ParkWest
cannot show that the District Court misapplied the law in granting summary judgment in favor of
MERS. The District Court merely applied the Idaho Contractor Registration Act, which
provides clearly established penalties for ParkWest's illegal actions. Any allegedly harsh results
that follow are ParkWest's own creation in (1) not complying with the law, and (2) entering the
Barnson Stipulation. An adverse result does not create a valid appealable issue in this instance.
ParkWest's arguments are "largely incomprehensible, unreasonable, and lacking foundation in
law," and an award of attorneys' fees to MERS is justified. Bowles v. Pro Zndiviso, Inc., 132
Idaho 371,377,973 P.2d 142, 148 (1999). "An award of attorney fees is appropriate if the law is
well-settled and the appellants have made no substantial showing that the district court
misapplied the law." Id. (internal citations omitted).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, MERS respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
decision of the District Court and award MERS its costs and attorneys' fees on appeal.
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